I don't think I'd agree. There was no particular enthusiasm for intervention, and certainly no grand plan or intention to move beyond Afghanistan. The invasion was essentially because
(a) the Kremlin feared that otherwise the country would collapse into anarchy, and become a conduit for Islamic fundamentalism (memories of the fall of the Shah were very fresh) into Sov Central Asia
(b) there was a belief (wrong, but genuine) that otherwise Afghan leader Amin -- who was plaguing them with requests for military assistance -- would turn to the Americans
(c) and internal power politics applied. General Secretary Brezhnev had died and been jump-started a few times and was pretty near gaga (in some of the discussions he called Afghanistan 'Czechoslovakia', obviously harkening back to the invasion of the latter in '68); insofar as he thought at all, he throught it would be a re-run -- a quick and largely bloodless invasion, a brief show of strength to cow the dissidents and then withdrawal. Ideology chief Suslov was a real hawk: anywhere the red flag once flew had to remain in the Sov sphere. Foreign minister Gromyko knew that letting an ally fall to rebels would be giving the message to the rest of the 3rd World that Moscow was an impotent ally. Defence minister Ustinov was a spineless crony of Brezhnev's and refused to pass on the concerns of his generals. KGB chief Andropov was about the only one with serious misgivings, but he was running to be Brezhnev's successor and knew the rest of the corrupted inner circle were afraid of him, and so could not afford to look weak on the defence of Soviet interests abroad.
All the best
Mark
Powered by hypermail