Martin,>Stragetically there is a difference between heavies and lights, mobility for one, staying power and defensive capability for another.
Sandy,>"Staying power" and "defensive capability" have nothing to do with strategy, except insofar as you generate a strategy based on your tactical abilities.
Martin,>Tactics and strategy are totally interlinked. One cannot use any strategy unless your troops have the capability to perform it. Therefore the tactical abilities (like staying power and mobility etc) of your troops have everything to do with your strategy.
What Martin seems to be calling strategy is more appropriately referred to as tactics. Strategy includes (among others): selecting/prioritizing targets, assigning/forward-basing forces under individual theater commanders, and allocating financial resources appropriately. Strategy assumes the necessary logistics and intelligence, which is why, as Martin pointed out, >"amateur soldiers look at tactics, professionals look at Logistics."<
And yet, Sandy contributed to the semantic confusion with, >An army can either choose to use a raiding strategy, or a persisting strategy. Either may be utilized vs either military or logistic objectives. This gives us four distinct strategies: raiding/military, raiding/logistic, persisting/military, and persisting/logistic.<
In practice it's not that simple. For the sovereign who STARTS a war, his/her objectives might be one or more of many. As Clausewitz (sp?) wrote in "On War," military power is the extension of political power; and war is diplomacy through other means (the exercise of military power to obtain political objectives). One might wish simply to destroy the opponent's ability to wage war, or to gain some kind of economic objective (such as trading rights or a warm water port), or (in Glorantha) to advance the Glowline, or (on occassion) to conquer and occupy. This is Political Stategy, and has almost nothing to do with individual unit capabilities. And the execution of that strategy through military power must be done with the political objective in mind.
Within that strategy there is a more detailed level of strategy designed to meet the political objectives. If the war is a total war, the objective is usually either (1) conquest, or (2) defense against conquest. A more detailed level of strategy then comes into play which I referred to above. The warlord (whether a single man or general staff) must prioritize targets. Likely targets include armies, individual leaders, producers of weapons, College of Magic, sources of national morale (Holy Places), potential allies, supply lines, etc. If we are the Russians in either World War, perhaps we only need to withdraw far enough to over extend enemy supply lines and let the weather do the rest. If the war will be over in a single season, economic targets are most likely unimportant. Again, this level of stategy depends not on unit capabilities. Selection/prioritizing of targets actually has more to do with your enemy's capabilities than with your own.
Once you have your targets, how do you hit them? This is Tactics. Now
don't get me wrong, there are more detailed levels of tactics as well,
such as the individual General's deployment and maneuver of his forces,
the individual commander's decision to sally forth from a fortification
at a particular moment, the individual wyvern rider's choice of
"dogfight" maneuvers, the individual footsoldiers choice of whether to
finish off a disabled enemy footsoldier or help your wounded comrade
against his more skillful opponent, and the master swordsman's choice of
combination moves. What the company commander calls strategy is really
tactics.
Now for three related topics. Good generals know their unit's capabilities and choose correct courses of action for those units. Better generals make sure the men are well fed, well supplied, well trained, and well led, so that they can do what's needed. Great generals do both while preventing the enemy generals from doing the same. This requires superior intelligence (not smarts, rather knowledge of the enemy's plans, movements, etc).
Gloranthan tactics should be very different from classical historical tactics. Brilliant tacticians will find tactics which capitalize on available capabilities. Gloranthan wars should be fought in three or four dimensions. One of DP's obvious limitations is that it simplifies/abstracts the game mechanics to a point where aerial and magical units lose many of their strongest advantages (one remaining is their mobility, which allows them to deploy in spread-out formations defensively but still mass for attacks). Gloranthan armies would also seek to capitalize on the many flexible uses of air and magical units in ways which Alexander the Great probably never imagined. Reconnaissance, misdirection, tactical deception, and "strategic" attacks deep behind enemy lines against strategic targets.
Aerial components of armies in Glorantha would also serve much the same purpose as light cavalry, harassing opposing heavy forces to break up formations and disrupt focussed assaults while protecting friendly heavy units from the same. A single wyvern rider could drop a large stone from great altitudes to disrupt the advance of heavy units completely. A rear guard action without the benefit of aerial units would fail against aerial attackers, leaving the main force unprotected. Finally, let's not forget the powers of wind and storm, which would function as aerial units of sorts.
...I'll give up the podium for a while.
Happy Adventuring, Tim
"For 800 years, the Mongol system worked because great fighters were
great logisticians"--From "The Devil's Horsemen" by James Chambers
"Supply was indeed the basis of Alexander's strategy; and when the
climate, human and physical calendar of a given region are known, one can
often determine what Alexander's next move will be."--From "Alexander the
Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army" by Professor Donald W.
Engels, Wellesley College
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