Russell Massey
>I strongly believe that any attempt to reduce the plethora of
>differently operating types of warriors found in ancient and
>medieval times to just four categories is a dangerous
>oversimplification.
Let's not get overdramatic. "Dangerous"? Whose life or psyche is threatened by such a contention? I may be right or wrong, but I don't think I've exposed anyone to any danger.
As I stated clearly before, being able to classify differently operating types of warriors is a progressive, useful step. Think back to the time of Linnaeus, who tried to organize all the manifold types of life into species, genera, families, and phyla. This was not a dangerous oversimplification, but a handy classification.
When I state that a Cretan slinger, an English longbowman, and a Burgundian handgunner are all missile-armed troops, it does not mean that I don't recognize any tactical differences between them any more than the fact that a bludgeon and a rapier are both melee weapons means I can't see any difference between them. On the army level, there's little difference in the way you employ a man wielding either. While there are slight differences in the way you'd use longbowmen as opposed to slingers, these are differences of degree, not kind. Both are vulnerable to a cavalry charge, and must be protected by close-order footmen. Both are able to hold off missile-using cavalry with reasonable effectiveness. Both can be expected to be able to retire from heavily-armored close-order infantry more speedily than the foe can close.
>It is incorrect to state any man armed with a bow is a "light
>infantryman" and therefore fights in a loose skirmish formation,
>avoiding contact with any enemy by scarpering as necessary.
I guess I'll just have to choose your tac, and say no, you're incorrect, not me. So there.
The Persian formation _was_ looser than the Greek formation. More room is needed to use a bow than a spear -- you can actually touch your companions on either side with your arms while carrying a spear. Not while loading and loosing arrows. The men in the front carried shields -- sometimes servants even held the shields for them. The presence of servants standing next to the front rankers somehow makes me doubt that they stood a regulation 1.5 to 2 feet apart, as did the Greeks. Think on it. 1.5 to 2 feet for each file. That's pretty darn close-order. When Hans Delbruck doubted that 1.5 foot files were actually possible, he tested it by having a group of students form a phalanx with long wooden poles. It turned out that the interval between these untrained men was less than 2 feet each, and that they could move quite easily in such close spacing.
But moving easily and shooting an arrow are quite different matters. It's plain that the Persian were not as tight in their ranks as the Greeks. And for that matter, not as tight as the Saxon housecarls, the Roman legions, or even American Civil War troops (who charged shoulder-to-shoulder).
In addition, though Persian infantry didn't normally scamper backwards away from the foe, they absolutely avoided contact with the enemy in the most basic way possible -- by refusing to advance. Standard Persian tactics were to advance to within arrow range, hold your ground, and fire at the foe. They did not charge the foe as a normal procedure. They had very specific tactics intended to generate victory. Namely, when they fought other missile-users, the Persians with their superior quality troops would naturally win. When they faced heavy infantry (which they did, on occasion, before meeting the Greeks), the Persians would halt the charge of the enemy infantry by using their light cavalry. These horsemen would run to the flank of the advancing foe and riddle them with arrows and javelins. The enemy would stop advancing and the flanks would turn towards the horsemen to defend themselves against this assault -- thus, the charge had halted. Moreover, the enemy force typically halted within range of the Persian archers, who proceeded to riddle them with arrows until the battle was won.
At Marathon, the Persians had no cavalry in action, and so could not halt the attack of the Greek foot. Despite this, it's clear from Delbruck's calculations (among others) that Marathon, despite its reputation as a one-sided victory, was a very near thing. If the Greeks had started charging a minute too soon, or too late, they would have failed in their assault, either by being totally exhausted when they arrived at the enemy troops, or by taking too long to charge, and being destroyed by the Persian arrows. Miltiades wrested a very difficult victory from a superior army and is rightly honored.
>It should be noted that the Persians did not flee at first
contact, >as would be expected of troops not expecting or equipped
for melee
But as _would_ be expected of troops with little or no experience fighting enemy heavy foot. The Persian infantry rarely did this -- either the cavalry stopped the enemy from charging, or the enemy had no heavy foot to begin with. Since the Persians knew their men were better-trained, stronger, and of higher morale than the Greeks, they figured they had nothing to worry about.
>Bronze hoplite armour was not "discarded so they could run
faster". >It disappeared because it as armies grew larger it was
economically
>too difficult to ensure that everyone had a set.
You are in error here, at least mostly. Greek armor was not bought by the government, but by the private citizens themselves. There was no "economic" hardship to the city. Not until the latter stages of the Pelopennesian Wars did the cities buy their own gear and use it to outfit less-wealthy warriors as hoplites. Before then, such warriors simply fought as peltasts. Even then, this step was not taken because the armies were too small, but because keeping an army in the field for an extended length of time imposed too great a hardship on the citizenry, and so professionals were needed.
If the Persians were inferior to the Greeks solely because of their crappier armor, then surely an ill-armored Greek in cloth would be highly vulnerable to one wearing bronze. Consider that the cloth-wearing Greek doesn't even have a bow to help defend himself. If simply wearing lighter armor makes one an inferior warrior, then the Greeks would not have discarded it. The fact that they did demonstrates that there is more to the difference between light and heavy infantry than armor thickness.
In addition, the Alexandrian creation of hypaspists -- nigh-armored hoplites -- demonstrates that this trend (of lighter armor) was not just economic in nature. The hypaspists were, if anything, considered superior to the regular phalangites.
>Close order is not generally so close as to involve contact with
>your neighbour. It is certainly not so close as to prohibit use of
>one's weapon! The formation you describe is actually that of
locked >shields
I know what locked shields are, and I know what Herodotus, Xenophon, etc. wrote. The Greek phalanx had intervals of 1.5 to 2 feet. The Roman legion was nearly as rightly-packed. Ditto for the descriptions of the dismounted knights at Crecy, etc. Paintings of military actions of the time show the same effect. Close order IS so close as to involve contact with your neighbor. Locking your shields _and_ advancing in close order is tough, no doubt about it. But just advancing in close order is comparatively simple, at least if you know how to march in step and have had some drill.
Advances with locked shields were considered "exceptional" because with the demise of the Roman Empire, there was no infantry left with the skill of advancing in close-order. It's a difficult thing to do. Even a trained phalanx couldn't always advance without breaking up the line. I suspect the accounts you've read, amazed at the advance of heavy infantry, stem from post-Roman times, in which infantry was basically immobile. These troops couldn't march in step, nor were they drilled. and so they rarely charged or even advanced.
>You opine that Glorantan troops are likely to be inferior in
>skill to those of the best Earthly troops, which surprised me.
Yet I hold to my belief firmly. And I am not alone on the Digest in believing so. The existence of healing magic and resurrection, and a somewhat firmer knowledge of an afterlife have, in my opinion, enervated Gloranthan warriors by comparison.
ULERIA
>I am equally certain that if the male character is invited to
>worship at Uleria's temple, at least one of the women will want to
>go as well.
>Now, I don't see why a young woman would not be allowed at the
>temple but I was wondering what kind of "private" worship they
might >have if they asked.
The Uleria Temple has three doorways. One is for fertility magic, and both men and women can use this -- not just for personal fertility, of course, but also for their beasts and/or crops.
The second door is for sex, and is the most famed and talked-about function of Uleria's temples, but that's probably because us Westerners from Earth are notoriously prurient.
The third door is for conversation, music, etc. Think of the classic Japanese Geisha or Chinese flower girl. They weren't just for sex -- some didn't put out at all, in fact. They played lutes, told jokes, and so forth.
Now, I suspect that women visiting Uleria tend to use the third door more than the second, and men are the other way round (at least, unattached men), but there is certainly going to be some overlap. If a woman is highly interested in sex, nothing's easier than signing up as a temporary lay member and using the temple's second door to pick and choose a man for your partner.
And anyone that wants can take lectures on seduction, child-rearing, or pleasuring one's partner. Such lectures are normally delivered in the third area of the temple.
Timothy Torres"
>Sandy contributed to the semantic confusion with, An army can
>either choose to use a raiding strategy, or a persisting strategy.
I fear you've misunderstood my point Timothy. Soon you'll see that I pretty much concur with you.
>In practice it's not that simple. For the sovereign who STARTS a
>war, his/her objectives might be one or more of many.
Yes, absolutely. My only point was that in attaining that objective, there are a number of possible techniques (as you know). In dividing up all possible strategies into a mere four categories I am simplifying a complex situation, but I don't believe I'm oversimplifying any more than considering all amphibious operations as having common characteristics is somehow oversimplifying their situation. If a sovereign chooses a persisting military strategy (the classic case), then he could in theory select hundreds of different ways of doing this. However, only a few ways will actually work in practice, because of his army's capabilites, not to mention his foe's.
>Selection/prioritizing of targets actually has more to do
>with your enemy's capabilities than with your own.
No doubt about it. When I described the four most basic types of strategy, it was with no thought that a general could pick and choose among them freely. Take for instance the Welsh defense against the English conquest. They raided the English areas, killed lone bands of soldiers, raided towns. In effect, they were following a raiding, guerrilla strategy. Now, no other strategy would have worked for them. If they'd massed an army and invaded England, they'd have been soundly whipped. If they'd tried to build a line or castles, they'd have been stopped early. So the Welsh used the only technique available to them. The English responded with a persisting strategy -- building lines of castles and slowly taming the Welsh countryside. Since the Welsh were unable to capture the English castles, this was effective. The tamed Welsh areas were lost economically to the wild Welsh chieftains, and they instead became a source of economic strength to the English. The English had chosen not only a persisting strategy, but an economic one. On the occasions they send armies to attack the Welsh warriors directly, this was generally a flop. Either the Welsh simply avoided the English army, or they harassed it so much that it was defeated. In the end, the Welsh had become so weak by comparison to the English that they could be conquered outright.
Now, this strategy wouldn't have worked in other times or places, but the English system of using military forces to garrison logistical targets has been used many times since, though with clear differences in technique, because of the nature of the enemy and of one's own army. I freely admit to the differences -- but I also contend that there are similarities, and these should not be overlooked either.
David Hall
>The descriptions of the KoW's origins sound a bit too mundane for
>me. I can't help thinking there's something more sinister behind it
I agree. There is something really bad going on here. It's not just a case of a bunch of guys going into bloodlust while isolated. Something HAPPENED during the Ban, and the KoW is the result, and they are going to be a problem for people beyond Fronela someday.
>I didn't think the KoW's army was all horsemen either. There must
be >a large number local peasants
Myself, I don't think they use many local peasants. Remember, these guys are suppressed magically. Among other things, they're Tapped to the point that they have no spirit or elan or aggressiveness left at all. The good side to this is that the KoW need never fear a rebellion. Once they conquer an area, it's theirs with a minimum of garrisoning. The bad side is that their peasants are worthless for any purpose but thralldom.
James Wadsley
>Sandy Petersen and many others have written interesting articles
on >warfare and in particular classification of troop units. Being
>rather poorly read on the subject I would very much appreciate some
>good references
Here's a number of excellent books, well worth buying, and all in print. I wish my detractors would read them. All these books are non-technical and easy to read and understand, even Delbruck's. Also, they're all available in trade paperback.
Archer Jones: THE ART OF WAR IN THE WESTERN WORLD. Brand new, and by one of the most respected military historians alive.
Hans Delbruck: four volume set -- WARFARE IN ANTIQUITY, THE BARBARIAN INVASIONS, MEDIEVAL WARFARE, THE DAWN OF MODERN WARFARE. Written in the 1920s, but still authoritative. Translated from German, so the Deutsch RQers can read the original. He never did finish writing the last book, which was to take us right up to WWI, but most RQers only care about the earlier periods anyway.
Dupuy & Dupuy: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY. If you own only one single book on military matters, it ought to be this one. Want to know what happened in the War of Jenkin's Ear? The wars of the Ming dynasty? It has _everything_.
John Keegan, A HISTORY OF WARFARE. Has been attacked because of small technical errors, but the overall sweep of the work is breathtaking. Clauswitzian battle turns out to have been invented three times. Once by the Greeks, once by the Maoris, and once on Easter Island. Why were horse nomads such bad news? Keegan tells you why in a very clear and gruesome manner.
John Keegan, THE FACE OF BATTLE. He explains in detail what it was like to stand in the front line at Agincourt. He also covers Waterloo and the Somme with the same perspective, but Agincourt is probably the one we're most interested in.
Ardant du Picq, THE ART OF BATTLE. Explains in detail the importance of morale. Talks about many ancient battles, and why casualties were so light among the victors, etc. One of the most important books of military history ever written -- it's right up there with Clauswitz's ON WAR and even Sun Tzu's manuscript. Ardant du Picq isn't so easy to find by himself, but there's a new trade paperback out that contains not only du Picq, but also ON WAR, and Jomini's book as well, so it's quite the buy.
??can't remember the editor?? Or the title -- something like HISTORY OF WORLD WARFARE? I bought it just a couple weeks ago and it's really good, but I admit all these military history titles start blending together after a while -- just take the words "war" "art" "battle" and "history" and mix them together and presto you've got a new title. I wish they'd name their books more elegantly. *sigh* Anyway, the HISTORY OF WORLD WARFARE (if that's its title) is a collection of historical essays and excerpts covering all cultures and eras. You can read an Arab's commentary on Crusading warfare, for instance. This is a fine fine book. It's available in trade paperback and there's no other book like it. Look in the bookstore for it, and when you spot the one with essays from all times and places, you've found it. It's about the same size as Archer Jones' book, but much thicker.
I suppose that's enough books for now. There's others, though, like Xenophon's PERSIAN EXPEDITION which not only illuminates ancient warfare and culture, but is a crackerjack story, or the new edition of Chinese military works which is filled with great anecdotes and conflicting glosses.
DOCTOR SEUSS
Okay you guys, I've had it with this damn mispelling of Dr.
Seuss's name as "Suess". GET IT RIGHT, GUYS! I've been seeing this
as a subject line for days now and I've just been quiet, but I've
had enough. SEUSS SEUSS SEUSS SEUSS. Okay? It's pronounced just like
the Greek king of the gods, and the man's real name was Theodore
Seuss Geisel. No, he wasn't a real doctor, but it doesn't matter,
because he singlehandedly transformed children's literature from
Dick & Jane into stuff worth reading.
End of Glorantha Digest V2 #177
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