>As a professional military officer, I have to contribute to the debate on
>strategy and tactics. As much as I hate to say it, Sandy is (strictly
>speaking) more right than Martin in the following exchange:
Aaargh!
>Martin,>Stragetically there is a difference between heavies and lights,
>mobility for one, staying power and defensive capability for another.
>Sandy,>"Staying power" and "defensive capability" have nothing to do with
>strategy, except insofar as you generate a strategy based on your
>tactical abilities.
>Martin,>Tactics and strategy are totally interlinked. One cannot use any
>strategy unless your troops have the capability to perform it. Therefore
>the tactical abilities (like staying power and mobility etc) of your
>troops have everything to do with your strategy.
>What Martin seems to be calling strategy is more appropriately referred
>to as tactics. Strategy includes (among others): selecting/prioritizing
>targets, assigning/forward-basing forces under individual theater
>commanders, and allocating financial resources appropriately. Strategy
>assumes the necessary logistics and intelligence, which is why, as Martin
>pointed out, >"amateur soldiers look at tactics, professionals look at
>Logistics."<
I must say I don't think this is on at all. I thought Sandy was the only person who deserved to be corrected for his failings. To have slurred my Yelmic perfection is very uncouth and Orlanthi of you! (where is Shargash when you need him?)
Okay, okay, you got me there. However I have to add that I was talking about military strategy on the field of war and not the whole host of actions and permutations which lead up to it. Blame my reading if you like, cos I did my thesis on Napoleonic warfare and I have been rather influenced by Chandlers "Campaigns of Napoleon", which I would recommend to everyone as a good read and an excellent doorstop.
Clauswitz was good but after reading his "On War" I found myself remembering why I gave up politics as a hobby. His statement that "war is a continuation of policy by other means" is true but I think that its in the modern world politics and war have become so inextricably linked. (before hordes of people complain that they have always been, all I'm saying is that they are totally interlinked now, whereas in the past it was partial).
Here is what I consider the levels of strategy to tactics, and excuse me for using my own wording here cos this is taken from all my reading, not one source:
High Strategy: As you said, the assigning of logistics, goals, commanders, dispositions and political objectives to the process of war. This is usually the first step in a conflict and shaps its form.
"Field" Strategy: This is the manouvering of armies/corps against the opponent, to fulfill the aims of higher strategy. In Napoleonic terms (or any ancient period) this is the art of deploying forces to maximise your opponents weaknessess and your own strengths. Also it includes forcing your opponent to battle (or avoiding it) and in all senses, using the resources provided to give the best results.
Grand Tactics: The manouvering of troop bodies en mass on or around the point of battle to achieve ones goals.
Unit tactics: The actual combat activities of the units making up the larger bodies moved in the Grand tactical arena.
Here is an example:
1602 invasion of Sartar:
The Red Emperor decides to attack Sartar: High Strategy
The Imerial Army, the Bat, various other nasties and the Provincial Army are assigned to the task of subduing Sartar: High Strategy:
The Red Emperor himself commands: High strategy decision
The goals are decided upon: High Strategy
The army marches on Runegate, objective to break the Sartarte defense and to bring them to battle: High Strategy
The army manouvers to force them to battle, cut retreats, threaten objectives and to force Sartarite responses: Field Strategy
When manouvering around the Quivini mts they force Salinarg to retreat from battle rather than be cut off: Grand Tactics
Boldhome is attacked, Lunar army units storm the city: Unit tactics
>. One might wish simply to destroy the
>opponent's ability to wage war, or to gain some kind of economic
>objective (such as trading rights or a warm water port), or (in
>Glorantha) to advance the Glowline, or (on occassion) to conquer and
>occupy. This is Political Stategy, and has almost nothing to do with
>individual unit capabilities. And the execution of that strategy through
>military power must be done with the political objective in mind.
I agree totally, but its not a sudden thing, there are no clear lines to be draw, rather its a steady progression from small unit tactis to the goals of a King. At least thats how it seems to me. They all blend together into the whole art of war.
I think we are all suffering from sematic problems too and as David Gadbois rightly pointed out to me, this medium leaves you vulnerable to nit-picking from some smug bastard sitting in the Imperial War museum, with access to a time machine so he can pop back and ask Alexander something. Of course I would never do that...........
>Now for three related topics. Good generals know their unit's
>capabilities and choose correct courses of action for those units.
>Better generals make sure the men are well fed, well supplied, well
>trained, and well led, so that they can do what's needed. Great generals
>do both while preventing the enemy generals from doing the same. This
>requires superior intelligence (not smarts, rather knowledge of the
>enemy's plans, movements, etc).
You summed that up really well.
Martin
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