Imperial strategy and logistics

From: Svechin_at_cs.com
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2000 11:34:58 EST


Peter comments:
>Canonical sources state that the Oslir is navigable as far as Furthest, but
>that doesn't mean there are not several portages involved to bypass
>troublesome stretches of the river.

Up till Furthest, there are no portages to be worried about, though the river does shrink considerably after Mirins Cross.

>The sixty mile portage to get to Alda
>Chur is three day's journey by foot or horse; a caravan would take a week
even
>with a good road. IMHO that's a big barrier. Remember that most trade in
>ancient/medieval times was in luxury goods precisely because overland
>transportation was difficult, expensive, and risky. The Lunar quartermasters
>will have to unload their boats and carry their supplies several times
through
>wilderness infested with bandits, Broos, Dragonewts, and hostile aborigines.
>You'll also need to feed the horses and mules, not to mention the troops
>guarding the caravans.

The Empire maintains six main operational bases in the Pass and Prax and routes its supplies through them in the 1621 period. Each base is a fortified point, with strong garrison forces present. Each point has storage facilities for large amounts of grain and meats as well as baking and preserving facilities.

Furthest serves as the prime base.
Alda-Chur is the main linking base into the Pass and was vital for contiuned operations in the region.
Pavis is a spur from the main supply line, but are vital for political reasons, rather than operational and thus has a large garrison. Boldhome is a central point of control but is not an operational base, rather it is an admin centre with political value. Whitewall serves as the primary base for projection in the south, with routes going into Esolria and Heortland for the conquest armies there. Karse serves as the newest point but due to Imperial weakness at sea this is not an advantage for them yet.

Thus the main routes of logistical effort are Furthest to Alda-chur and Alda-Chur to Whitewall, with offshots along the way and stop off points in profusion. The Empire only campaigned against Broyan and Heortland when it had secured the initial lines of supply into south Sartar, where Wilmskirk was used as the operational base.

Thus from Slave Wall to Alda-chur we have 50 miles along a good road with powerful Imperial forces available to patrol both ends of the route. The garrison at Slave Wall and Alda-chur are two days ride apart. Any caravan will be 2 days from reinforcements. Any caravan will be escorted by the same units evey trip.

From Alda-chur to Whitewall, is more difficult, but it is done in stages along the Kings roads. Imperial garrisons at Dangerford, Jonstown, Boldhome and Wilmskirk project power with cavarly patrols and road forts. Caravans along this route are covered most of the way by patrols and immediate back-up. Also, the tribes and clans along this route have been subjected to the most thorough cowing or alliances, rendering them as safe as is practical.

>I'd guess that half the Sartar garrison's troops are involved in securing
>their supply lines. That includes caravan escorts, garrisons of forts at the
>loading/unloading points and at the supply dumps, and troops helping to
secure
>local supplies through tax collection.

More than half. Consider though that much of this activity is spent building up reserves for campaigning. Yes most of the troops are used all the time but at any one point in time they can desist logistical operations and live of stored food for weeks, allowing them to assemble significant force quickly and without concern for supply lines. This is a tremendous advantage over the Orlanthi who have no such cushion to fall back on - taken as it is in tribute by the Empire, a double edged sword.

>It's feasible, but it is also a major
>burden on the Lunars. A smart Lunar commander would have a year's supplies
>stockpiled in case of trouble, but that stockpile is finite and vulnerable.

Exactly. Not smart. Standard procedure.

>Training
>Liddell Hart's ideas rule here. The phalanx is the essence of the direct
>approach, and o/i skirmishers personify the indirect approach.

I would argue that LHs indirect approach is an operational concept and thus the units tactical method is irrelevant to the issue. Epaminondas deployed a phalanx with an echeloned flank against the weakest flank of the enemy - indirect if I ever saw it, yet it was done with a Phalanx.

>Arguing about
>which is better in the abstract is pointless; it depends entirely on the
>commanders and the circumstances of battle.

ie the operational level of war - agreed.

>(Oh, and a day a week is a lot of
>training, esp. for kids who learn faster and more deeply than adults. On the
>other hand indirect approach troops need more skills than direct approach
>units. Think Napoleonic cavalry. Think special forces / Spetsnaz units.)

Hmm, I do recall the Spanish guerillas, who had no training to speak of, did rather well against the far better trained Napoleonic cavalry, who were all dragoons, or mediums and all trained for direct charge style combat. According to your interpretation of LH, the Spanish would have had to be better trained than the Napoleonic cavalry as they were "indirect" forces. I think that the issue is one of operational deployment rather than training. Training allows one to deploy with some surety in your men that they can do the job.

Good post.

Martin Laurie


End of The Glorantha Digest V8 #168


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